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ABSTRACT
Strike activity in Spain is unusually high compared to most other developed countries
and, moreover, it has remained at a high level for the last decade, whilst strike rates
have been falling in most other countries.  One possible explanation for this poor
strikes record is Spanish labour law with respect to industrial disputes which may
be too permissive, or have remained permissive whilst other countries have tightened
their legislative frameworks.  By investigating the comparative strike record and
comparative strike law across Europe, it is clear that neither of the above scenarios
holds true.  Spanish law is neither particularly permissive, nor has it become more
permissive relative to other countries which suggests that, given some caveats,
Spanish strikes law cannot be held responsible for the poor strike record.  Some
tentative assessment of other possible explanations is made using industry data on
strikes, collective bargaining coverage and levels, union representation and the
proportion of fixed-term contract workers.  Taken together these results are indicative
of a role for non-legal industrial or labour market institutions in explaining strikes.
There is clearly, though, a crying need for more micro industrial relations data sets
to properly test the influence of both exogenous and endogenous factors in explaining
strikes.
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INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND THE LAW IN SPAIN
Simon Milner
1.  Introduction
The high level of Spanish strike activity over the last fifteen years sits uneasily
with the decline in activity almost everywhere else in the EU and the OECD.  Days
lost per thousand employees in employment was higher than in every OECD country
apart from Greece over the decade 1983 to 1992 (Bird, 1993).  Furthermore, in 1992
the rate of working days lost due to strikes in Spain, 688 per thousand employees,
was more than three times the rate of the next most strike ridden country (Ireland
with 220 days).  Therefore both the high average level of activity in recent years and
the lack of any declining trend combine to make Spain stand out in Europe on this
key measure of industrial relations performance.
There are a number of possible explanations for the relatively high and
apparently stable level of strike activity in Spain, and this paper concentrates on one
of those - the role of strike law.  This is partly driven by the fact that in the UK, the
country with the steepest fall in strike activity in the 1980s and early 1990s, many
commentators have emphasised the importance of changes in disputes law for
contributing to the decline in strike activity (inter alia McConnell and Takla, 1990;
Ingram et al, 1993).  It seems sensible therefore to investigate to what extent the very
different picture of activity in Spain over the same period is due to the influence of
strike law.
After presenting evidence on Spanish strike activity over two decades, Section
2 provides a comparative picture of strike activity in other large EU countries.
Information on other forms of collective dispute in Spain are also presented and
discussed in this section, but unfortunately adequate comparative data are somewhat
lacking in this area.  Section 3 begins with an explanation of why it is impossible to
judge the impact of Spanish strike law by analysing strikes data from Spain alone -
since there have been insufficient changes in the law over the period in question.
Having stated the case for comparative analysis and established some hypotheses
about comparative strike laws and strike activity, Section 3 proceeds with information
on strike laws across the EU, comparing each system with Spain's.  Comparative
analysis suggests that Spanish strike law can explain little of the high level of strike
activity in Spain, although there are some rather important caveats which are also
discussed in Section 4.  In light of this conclusion, Section 5 examines economic strike
theories and uses regression analysis of industry strikes data to suggest what might
explain high strike incidence in Spain.  The principal conclusion of this section is that
proper analysis of the Spanish strike record requires more comprehensive micro data.
Section 6 briefly discusses the proposed changes to Spanish strikes law currently
being muted by the government - considering whether or not they are likely to
reduce strike activity in the future.  Finally, Section 7 provides some conclusions.
2.  Labour Disputes in Spain and International Comparisons
a.  Introduction
One of the few measures of industrial relations outcomes collected in every
industrialised country is on strike activity viz the number of stoppages, the number
of workers involved in strikes and the number of working days lost.  Various authors
have amassed information on the definition of strikes, their measurement, the
2collection of data and specific limitations of official data in each country when
making international comparisons (inter alia Creigh, 1989).  Compared to many other
OECD countries Spanish strikes data are reasonably comprehensive in two ways:
there are no limitations on criteria for inclusion of stoppages in the statistics; and
parties involved in strikes are compelled to notify the relevant labour authorities that
a strike has taken or is taking place.  By comparison in the UK, for example, strikes
involving less than 10 workers or lasting less than a day are excluded (unless total
days lost exceed 100) and collection is less exhaustive than in Spain with no
obligatory notification requirement.  These measurement differences are likely to bias
upwards differences in the number of stoppages recorded but may only marginally
affect the difference in working days lost since the UK restrictions and those in other
countries will mainly exclude short, small strikes.
b.  Strike activity in Spain
Strike activity at the aggregate level in Spain is summarised in Table 1 and
Figures 1 to 3.  Key features include:  the explosion in strike activity, however
measured, after the death of Franco in 1975 after quite low levels of activity in the
early 1970s; a peak of activity in 1979 on three measures (number of stoppages and
number of stoppages and working days lost per thousand employees in
employment); fluctuation around a high average level in the 1980s/early 1990s
including two general strikes in 1988 and 1992.  The particularly important feature
of the strike record in the 1980s/early 1990s is that there have been no signs of a
trend fall in activity.  Even if the general strikes had not occurred in 1988 and 1992
the series would still not have shown a trend decline.
c.  Dispute activity in Spain
The Spanish labour authorities also collect data on other forms of collective
disputes-conciliation, mediation and labour court cases.  The time series for these data
are compared to those on stoppages in Figure 4 for the period 1981-1992.  The picture
is one of remarkable stability in relative usage.  The use of collective conciliation and
the labour courts (the latter only for "rights" - contract interpretation - disputes) has
generally stayed above the level of strikes throughout the period with collective
conciliation the most common means of pursuing a dispute.  However, the success
rate of conciliation - measured as the proportion of cases resulting in settlement - has
been very low, in many years less than 10% (Table 2).  This compares to an ACAS1
success rate in the UK of 80-90% in recent years (ACAS Annual Reports, various
years).  The explanation for this probably lies in the different procedural rules which
determine that parties in Spain must go through conciliation in order to access the
labour court system (see Section 3).  This option does not exist in the UK so parties
taking disputes to ACAS are less likely to be going through the motions in order to
access a higher and more heavyweight authority.  This whole area is potentially
fruitful for further research both within Spain and from a comparative perspective.
d.  International comparisons
The impression of a `strike problem' in Spain is graphically illustrated by
comparing the record on working days lost per thousand employees to the record for
4 other large European economies.  The time series are shown in Figures 5 and 6.
3Figure 6 is particularly illustrative, showing comparative activity in Spain in groups
of years over the 1970-1992 period against the strike records for the UK, France, Italy
and West Germany.  Up to 1975 the Spanish record was better than the average of
these four countries but it has been worse in every year since.  Particularly noticeable
is that whilst on average for the rest of these economies strike activity has declined
every year since 1984, in Spain there have been both rises and falls in activity.  The
only OECD country with a worse strike record in recent years is Greece.  Figure 5
shows that whilst the fall in strike activity in Britain has been impressive, this rather
pales by the extent of the fall in Italy over a similar period.  Note that West Germany
and France have the lowest levels of strike activity among these five countries for
most of the period.
One note of caution in interpreting these data concerns indexing the working
days lost simply by employees in employment.  In the UK most strikers are union
members, therefore the decline in working days lost on a per employee basis also
reflects the decline in union membership as well as a decline in the propensity of
union members to take strike action.  One way to take account of that is to index the
data by union membership rather than employment (as in Milner and Metcalf, 1993).
However, for other countries the union membership index may be inappropriate.
Many strikers are not union members in Spain, for example those taking part in the
general strikes, therefore a more appropriate index might be the number of
employees covered by collective bargaining.  This would probably be an appropriate
index for West German data as well.  However, in France and possibly also in Italy,
it does not appear that striking is restricted to either only union members or only
those covered by bargaining.  This may in large part be due to the legal frameworks
(see Section 3) which provide a constitutional right to strike and to organise strikes
for all workers whether or not they are union members or indeed are covered by a
union.
3.  Strike Law in EU Countries
a.  Comparative strike patterns and labour law
The improvement in the UK's ranking on strike activity within the OECD at
the same time as a build up of anti-union legislation not matched elsewhere is
consistent with the proposition that changes in labour law explain some of the decline
in strike activity.  Turning to Spain there are number of hypotheses which could link
the relatively high level of strike activity and differences in labour law across Europe:
Hypothesis 1:  Spanish strike law remained unchanged over the period whilst in
other countries the law on strikes has been tightened-up;
Hypothesis 2:  Spanish strike law became more relaxed whilst in other countries
it was unchanged or made more stringent;
Hypothesis 3:  Spanish strike law is generally more permissive than other
countries' laws.
If any of these hypotheses can be backed up with evidence on the relative levels of
and changes in strike law permissiveness across Europe, then strike law could well
be an important explanation for the relatively high level of strike activity in Spain.
4However, if none can be substantiated, this would instead suggest that Spanish strike
law is not an important explanation for the relatively high level of activity in the
1980s and 1990s.  It should be emphasised though that such a finding would not rule
out the possibility that future changes in Spanish strike law could reduce the level
of strike activity.
b.  Spanish strike law
The main provisions of Spanish law on disputes were established in the 1977
Legislative Decree on Strikes (included in the 1978 Constitution) and amended in
some areas by the 1981 Decision of the Constitutional Court.  Although the relevant
labour authorities play important administrative roles in each region, the laws on
disputes are identical across the nation.
The drafters of the new law on industrial disputes rejected the compulsory
arbitration-based system in place under Franco in favour of a broadly defined strike-
based system.  Arbitration is still available, as are other forms of non-strike resolution
procedures such as conciliation and mediation, but there is no compulsory
mechanism triggered in the event of a labour dispute.
Spanish labour law delineates to some extent between disputes concerning
rights (the interpretation of an existing contract) and those over interests (the
substantive or procedural terms of a new contract).  The key difference concerns the
role of conciliation and the labour courts.  For rights disputes, parties must use
conciliation in order to gain access to the labour courts.  For interest disputes parties
can use conciliation but cannot then go on to the jurisdiction of the labour courts
which are deemed not to be competent in such matters.  However, for both interest
and rights disputes the law currently states that if parties wish to avail themselves
of conciliation they must give up their right to take strike action.  This is clearly
sensible for rights disputes since should conciliation fail, the parties can progress to
a higher authority in the guise of the labour courts.  However, it seems rather
unsatisfactory in the case of interest disputes since the parties have no final procedure
which they can turn to in the event of the failure of conciliation.  It seems probable
that this rule rather stifles the role of conciliation in interest disputes.2
The Spanish Constitution recognises an individual employee's right to strike -
ie their contract of employment is suspended rather than broken in the event of strike
action. A striking worker or indeed group of striking workers cannot be sacked while
taking part in a legal strike as defined below.  Their contract of employment is
suspended but they are not entitled to unemployment benefit, nor can their
dependents claim social security benefits.  During a strike an employer is prohibited
from employing anyone who did not work for the firm before the dispute.  The 1985
ILO report on Spain states that employers are not averse to sacking the ringleaders
of strikes - but generally do so sufficiently far from the end of the strike to prevent
direct association by the labour authorities.
There are, however, some restrictions on this general right to strike, both
procedural (regulations stipulating the conduct of the strike) and substantive (causes
of and types of action).
5Procedural Limits: 
.strike decision:  There are three legal methods of calling strike action:  agreement
reached by majority decision at a joint meeting of worker representatives; by secret
vote of the workers; and by agreement of the unions involved in the establishment,
firm or industry.  Therefore a key feature of the Spanish scene is that works councils
as well as unions are empowered to call strike action.
.notice period:  Five days advance notice must be given to the employer affected by
the action (ten days in the public sector).
.strike committee:  A strike committee from the affected plant consisting of a
maximum of 12 workers must be elected.  This committee participates in union,
administrative or legal action taken to settle the conflict.  It is also charged with
guaranteeing the provision of minimum services, though these are not defined in
current statute law.
Substantive Limits:
.non-strike action:  Any non-strike action such as go slows or work to rules are
deemed to be `unwarranted' (ILO, 1985) which presumably means illegal.  The ILO
mission also reported that cases of non-strike action were infrequent but that even
when they did occur the illegality did not always lead to legal action.  Similarly to
the UK (Milner, 1993a) there are no official data on the incidence of non-strike action
in Spain.
.political and sympathy strikes:  Any strike motivated by political reasons or for any
other purpose unconnected with the occupational interests of the workers concerned
was deemed to be illegal in the original decree of 1977 but the Constitutional Court
partly overturned this to permit sympathy and secondary action.
.essential services:  As well as restrictions on the rights of certain public employees'
right to strike (police, armed services, merchant navy), there is a general provision
in the Constitution for the State to intervene in strikes to impose binding arbitration
on the parties to ensure provision of essential services to the public or protect the
national economy.  There are also specific conditions for the exercise of strike action
in public hospitals and railways.
.strikes over current contracts:  As in the US and some other EU countries (see
below), strikes which are intended to overturn the provisions of valid collective
agreements are illegal - although strikes concerning the interpretation of existing
agreements are valid after the Constitutional Court's decision of 1981.  For a strike
over differences in interpretation to be illegal the collective agreement must contain
a clause (a `no-strike clause') to this effect.
.picketing:  During a strike, pickets may attempt to peaceably induce other workers
to keep away from their workplace but no coercion or violence can be used.  If the
workers attempt to occupy their workplace as an extra form of protest, this is also
deemed to be illegal.
6.sanctions:  There do not appear to be clear rules detailing available sanctions for
employers against illegal strikers or their representatives.  However, this is one aspect
of the proposals to change statute strike law put forward by the government in 1992
and discussed in Section 6.
.lock-outs:  Lock-outs are lawful in certain situations  but are unusual.3
The key features of Spanish strike law can therefore be characterised as:
constitutionally protected right to strike in `legal' strikes for individual workers and
to organise strikes for unions and works councils; and some limitations on what
constitutes a `legal' strike.  Non-legal action includes:  non-strike action, political
strikes, strikes falling foul of procedural rules, strikes after or during conciliation,
strikes to change current contracts and strikes by certain categories of workers.
c.  Comparison with other EU countries
With the notable exception of Britain and Ireland there have been no major
legislative changes concerning industrial action in the 12 EU countries over the 1980s.
The key features of the legal framework operating in each country are summarised
in Appendix B.  They can be grouped under three headings (taken from Betten, 1985):
i.  The right to strike is a constitutional right of the worker and there are few
limitations on that right:  The most important countries to fall under this particularly
permissive ethos are France and Italy.  In both, workers have a constitutionally
guaranteed right to strike - their contract of employment is suspended during a strike
- "within the law regulating it [the right to strike]".  However, although no statute
law has been passed in either country to regulate this right, various judicial
precedents have restricted rights in an ad hoc way.  There are no procedural rules in
either country which, if flouted, make a strike illegal except in the public sector
where notification periods are mandatory for some groups.  Non-strike industrial
action appears to be illegal and similar rules apply to the legality of political and
sympathy strikes.  The key distinguishing feature of the two systems is that the right
to take and organise action is expressly that of the individual, irrespective of the role
of unions.
Belgium also appears to fall into this category since there is "... almost
complete freedom to engage in industrial warfare by the industrial parties,"
(Blanpain, 1990).  Contracts of employment are suspended during a strike and both
employees and unions have the right to organise strikes.  Non-strike action and
political strikes are illegal but sympathy strikes are lawful.  There is no statutory
position concerning strikes in essential services but there is a provision that a joint
committee of the employers and trade unions involved in a dispute must determine
both what services are to be maintained and how they are to be maintained during
the strike.  It seems that Luxembourg also fits into this category although the main
source on labour law and industrial relations in Luxembourg has a very sketchy
description of the law in this area (Schintgen 1990).
ii.  The right to organise a strike lies with trade unions (or similar), the right to
participate in those strikes is a right of workers:  Spain, (West) Germany, Portugal,
the Netherlands and Greece all fall into this category where there is a right to
7participate in union organised strikes.  In a similar way to the above category the
contract of employment is suspended during a strike rather than terminated.  There
are some marked differences in the definition of a legal strike within this broad
category.
In Germany the proportionality principle dominates matters.  Legal strikes are
those that:  respect the peace obligation during the contract period; are preceded by
a secret ballot; are `fair' - do not aim to destroy the firm; and are the weapon of last
resort - ultima ratio.  This means that non-strike action is illegal (contravenes peace
obligation), as are political strikes and that sympathy strikes are only permissable in
very narrow circumstances.  In terms of essential services, although there are no
statutory definitions of these, the proportionality principle would suggest that these
have to be kept running in the event of a strike.  German strike law is rather peculiar,
however, in permitting so-called `warning strikes' of short duration during contract
negotiations which in theory would contravene the proportionality principle.  There
has been a recent example of such a strike in the engineering industry (Financial
Times, 1.2.94).
Portugal has a slightly more permissive strike law compared to Spain.  In both
countries unions and works councils (called worker assemblies in Portugal) can call
strikes, but in Portugal strikes called by the latter are only legal if preceded by a
secret ballot of the relevant workers.  However, political and sympathy strikes are
legal in Portugal and lock-outs are prohibited.  Moreover, the legal position of non-
strike action is unclear whereas in Spain it is clearly illegal.
The legal position of strikes in the Netherlands is rather ambiguous since there
has been no statute law on the issue.  A mixture of judicial precedents and strike bills
(not enacted) provide some rather fuzzy rules.  These are summarised by Rood (1993)
as that strikes are unlawful if they are:  contrary to statute law; contrary to the
collective agreement; contrary to existing norms between the employer and union(s);
or manifestly unreasonable towards the employer.  Although not laid down by
precedent this suggests that non-strike action, most sympathy strikes and political
strikes would be unlawful.  There are no special rules for essential service workers
but presumably the legality of a strike could be challenged on the grounds of
reasonableness towards the employer because of the lack of readily available
substitutes.
Workers in Greece have a constitutionally protected right to participate in
union organised strikes - "wild-cat" or unofficial strikes are illegal - with the provisos
of 24 hours notification and the maintenance of `minimum services' during the strike.
The legal status of non-strike action, political strikes, sympathy strikes and picketing
are unclear.
The one important caveat about including Spain in this category is that there
does appear to be provision for workers to organise strikes outside the union or
works council system if a majority of the workers concerned vote in a secret ballot
to take action.  Although there appear to be no published data on the relative use of
different means of calling a strike it seems unlikely that there will be sufficient
organisation among workers to conduct a ballot on taking strike action in the absence
of unions, worker representatives or a works council.
iii.  There is no right to strike, but if they keep within certain rules, trade unions
and workers organising and/or participating in a strike enjoy a series of
immunities from penal and/or civil sanctions:  The immunities based system of
8strike law is confined to the UK and Ireland among the EU economies.  Individuals
have no right to strike in the sense stipulated elsewhere - a strike always involves a
breach of the employment contract such that the employee can be dismissed without
recourse to redundancy or unfair dismissal.  In the case of Britain, previous laws
which attempted to prevent victimisation of strike leaders, through selective sackings
of strikers, have been weakened.
Instead the strike laws turn on the concept of immunity from civil action (for
inducement of breach of contract) for organisers of `legal' strikes who may be unions,
their officials or someone completely unconnected with any union.  The most
significant regulations are those determining what constitutes a `legal' strike.
Although slightly less stringent in Ireland the main substantive and procedural rules
are as follows:
Substantive
·the golden formula:  Any industrial action must be `in contemplation or furtherance
of a trade dispute' to obtain immunity from civil action.  The scope of this so-called
`golden formula' was cut back in the 1980s through successive acts to exclude action
over political issues, closed shops, sympathy or secondary action, inter-worker
disputes, union recognition and activities of own employer outside the UK.
·limited immunity:  Between 1974 and 1982 trade unions `enjoyed' a blanket
immunity from civil action for organising industrial action if the action was covered
by the golden formula.  Since the 1982 Employment Act there has been rather ill-
defined limited immunity such that action which comes within the golden formula
and does not fall foul of procedural rules (see below) may still be subject to action
for the torts of conspiracy or interference or indeed other judge-discovered torts in
the future.  This has added an extra level of uncertainty into the question of what
constitutes an unlawful strike.
·strike breaking:  Until 1988 it was legal for a union to discipline or even expel a
member who refused to take part in a lawful strike - subject to certain procedural
stipulations.  However, since the 1988 Employment Act the union cannot take any
action against such members - even if the action receives overwhelming support in
a pre-strike ballot.
·essential services:  Although the government has promulgated the possibility of
extending a ban on strikes in essential services at various times over the last fifteen
years the law remains ostensibly unchanged in this area.  For two groups of workers
-the police and the armed services - strikes are a criminal offence.  There is also some
debate about the legal status of industrial action by communications workers and
prison officers.  Some other public service workers have de facto virtually given up
their right to strike in return for systems of pay determination which appear to
protect their interests.  These include firefighters, nurses and school teachers.  In
Ireland it is a criminal offence for gas and electricity workers to take industrial action.
9Procedural
·compulsory postal ballots:  The most well-known change in British labour law in
the 1980s was probably the new rules concerning compulsory pre-strike ballots first
introduced in the 1984 Trade Union Act.  The regulations have since been tightened
concerning constituencies balloted, separate majorities in each workplace affected and
location of the ballot (whereas from 1984 to 1988 workplace ballots were permitted,
since the 1988 Employment Act all ballots must be postal).  Statute law also stipulates
that the ballot paper must inform employees that taking part in action would breach
their employment contract and that the results of any ballot are only valid for 28 days
after the result - ie action must take place within 28 days to retain any immunity.
·notification:  As a result of the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights
Act organisers of industrial action must notify the employer of an intention to ballot
on industrial action at least seven days beforehand.
·unofficial action:  In order to escape liability for unlawful unofficial action (for
example an unballoted, wildcat strike) there are various rules that union leaders must
comply with concerning condemnation of the action.  These rules were tightened up
in the 1990 Employment Act.
The principle means of preventing `illegal' industrial action available to
employers (and union members and members of the public) is through injunctions,
which are often ex parte (the defendant need not be present).  There are extensive
remedies available for employers should action deemed to be illegal by the courts
take place, including large fines for contempt of court or sequestration of union funds
and other assets.  There have been some well-publicised examples of such remedies
being used in major 1980s disputes in coal mining, newspaper printing and ferries
(Elgar and Simpson, 1993, p.75).
·the hybrid:  Denmark has something of a hybrid arrangement such that it does not
fit easily into any of the three groups set out above.  Briefly whilst there is said to be
a general right to strike except during the period of a collective agreement (similar
to Germany), a contract of employment is terminated should a strike take place
(similar to UK and Ireland).  However, the latter regulation can be overridden by a
collective agreement term stipulating that a strike results in the suspension of the
individual contract.  According to Jacobsen (1988) most collective agreements include
such a clause.  A further unusual provision, which fits better with the Franco-Italian
model is that the right to organise a strike is not confined to a trade union, despite
the stipulation concerning intracontractual action.
d.  Conclusion
Comparison of EU countries' strike laws suggest two conclusions about
Spanish legal strictures on strikes.  First, Spain's laws are not particularly permissive
compared to the majority of EU states.  The provision of a right to strike such that
contracts of employment are suspended rather than terminated during action is
common.  The procedural and substantive rules appear to be very much in line with
what we might call the middling group on a permissiveness scale - with France and
Italy at the high end and Britain and Ireland at the other.
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Second, compared to a number of states Spanish strike law appears on paper
to be relatively clear - there is not enormous scope for confusion about what
constitutes legal and illegal action.  The one exception concerns the rules governing
the provision of minimum services which appear to be somewhat vague.  However,
in a number of other EU countries the definition of a legal strike appears to shift with
each important court case, presumably creating uncertainty among unions and
employers alike.  There is of course something to be said for having uncertainty in
legal parameters in that it may discourage risk averse parties from taking industrial
action, particularly if unions are more risk averse than employers. 
4.  Strike Laws and Comparative Strike Activity
Recapping our hypotheses concerning the influence of strike laws on relative
strike activity, there is no strong case for arguing that strike law in Spain can explain
the relatively high level of action (measured as days lost per thousand employees)
compared to other EU countries since the early 1980s.
Hypothesis 1:  Spanish strike law has remained unchanged whilst in other
countries the law on strikes has been tightened-up;  Apart from the UK and Ireland
no other countries in the EU have tightened up their strike laws in either procedural
or substantive terms during the period in question.  Therefore the fact that Spanish
strike law has remained fundamentally unchanged since the late 1970s is not
particularly unusual compared to the rest of continental Europe.  We find no support
for this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2:  Spanish strike law has been relaxed whilst in other countries it has
been unchanged or made more stringent;  Given the absence of change in Spain and
most other EU countries, this hypothesis can also be rejected.  There has been no
relaxation in Spanish statute law on strikes.
Hypothesis 3:  Spanish strike law is generally more permissive than other
countries' laws;  Although a strong argument that comparative labour law explained
a large part of relative strike activity would require that either hypotheses 1 or 2 were
supported by evidence of changes in law, in the absence of such evidence a more
moderate argument could rest on the general permissiveness of Spanish labour law
compared to other countries.  This argument would have to cope with two features
of the comparative strike series in Figure 6:  first the higher strike incidence of Spain
compared to UK, Germany and France from the mid-1980s; and secondly, the reversal
in ranking of Spain and Italy around the early to mid-1980s.  In order to be internally
consistent two conditions would have to be met:
a. Spanish strike law from the mid-1970s was more permissive than that
in Germany, the UK and France and;
b. although Italian law did not change in the early to mid- 1980s, there
must have been some reduction in workers' willingness to contravene
strike laws which are generally less permissive than those in Spain.
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The facts fit these conditions in regard to Germany and the UK but do not for France
and particularly Italy.  French and Italian strike laws are considerably more
permissive than those in Spain, yet both countries have had respectively better and
improving strike records compared to Spain since the mid-1970s.  Therefore it would
be difficult to sustain an argument that the general permissiveness of Spanish labour
law was an important explanation for the relatively poor strikes performance of Spain
since the early 1980s.
In rejecting all three of the potential links between comparative strike laws and
strike activity in the 1980s, two important caveats concerning such simple analysis of
strike laws and strike incidence across these countries should be emphasised.  First,
and probably of most significance, concerns the sanctions available to employers in
the event of illegal strike activity and the degree of law enforcement.  It may well be
that although on paper Spanish strikes law looks about average in the EU on a pro-
labour scale, because strike laws are unenforced by the State or sanctions available
against strikes are relatively ineffectual or employers are reluctant to use available
sanctions, even if the latter have the potential to stop action, then the legal
environment may de facto be rather permissive.  These issues would certainly warrant
further investigation, perhaps particularly concentrating on sectors where strike rates
are unusually high.
Second, a more thorough analysis of the impact of strike laws would require
controls for other factors associated with strike activity including inter alia
unemployment, political party in government, macroeconomic volatility, union
membership and organisation.  However there are probably too few years of
comparable strike activity data to warrant a more rigorous analysis and it would be
difficult to construct valid instruments to measure the impact of the level of and
changes in the permissiveness of strike laws.  Moreover, as Section 5 explains, there
is general dissatisfaction in the strikes literature with macro analyses of strike activity.
5.  What does Explain High Strike Incidence in Spain?
Although failing to reject the null-hypothesis is a useful and interesting
finding, it does rather leave a major question unanswered -what does explain the
high level of strikes in Spain?  This section discusses strike theories, some empirical
evidence on strike incidence and analyses the recent pattern of inter-industry strike
activity in Spain to try to provide some pointers towards answering this fundamental
question.
There are a welter of theoretical, empirical and anecdotal studies within
industrial relations on strikes.  All the constituent disciplines with a foothold in
industrial relations (economics, sociology, psychology, Marxism etc) have propagated
a number of competing explanatory theories.  We examine the hypotheses of
economic theories and briefly review the evidence on these, before making inferences
about their relevance for Spain.  One rather tentative conclusion is that whereas strike
laws appear to explain little of Spain's poor strike record, other aspects of Spain's
labour laws may play a more significant, though indirect, role in the way that they
influence industrial relations institutions.
a.  Theories
Economists find explaining strikes a real problem because they are so evidently
pareto-inefficient.  Providing that the two parties are relatively well informed about
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each others reservation position in the event of a strike, they are rational and risk
averse, then a strike should always be avoided by mutually beneficial concessionary
bargaining.  In such a world, strikes should not happen.  That they do take place,
rather frequently in some firms, industries and countries, is known as the Hicks
Paradox - after his early discussion of this irrational behaviour (Hicks, 1932).  He
concluded that strikes must be the result of faulty negotiations - ie mistakes which
one would expect to be fairly rapidly corrected (strikes should be short) and be
randomly distributed.  Since Hicks's work, various US economists have developed
more sophisticated explanations for this still relatively irrational activity.  More
detailed summaries of these theories can be found in Babcock and Olson (1992) and
Milner (1993b).  All the theories are relatively abstract in formulation, such that it is
rather difficult to both test them and differentiate between them when using real
world strikes data.
Three of the theories revolve around the concept of one or the other party
failing to correctly predict the outcome of a potential strike.  In a sense, they are
attempting to develop Hicks's mistake-based theory by suggesting possible non-
random determinants of mistakes:
·asymmetric information:  If the assumption of perfect information is dropped in
favour of the more realistic assumption of some degree of private or asymmetric
information then two possible explanations for strikes emerge:  workers are not fully-
informed about the employer's ability to pay, and assuming that they believe profits
are higher than reported, strike with the aim of capturing some undisclosed rent; the
employer is not fully-informed about how militant the workforce are, regarding their
claim.  In the event of the latter, an employer may believe that he is calling the
workers' bluff by refusing to concede at the threat of a strike.
·principal-agent problems:  These theories (starting with Ashenfelter and Johnson's
seminal 1969 paper), revolve around the recognition that more than two parties have
a stake in collective bargaining, and that their interests and objectives are not
necessarily just to reach a fair settlement.  Ashenfelter and Johnson particularly
emphasised the relationship between union leaders and the rank and file, in
situations where the latter rely on the former for an assessment of the employer's
likely concession curve in the event of a strike.  If the members think that their agent,
the negotiator, is shirking in negotiations and misrepresenting the employer's
position, then they may push for strike action to audit the negotiator.
Although not explicitly put forward as a separate theory, there is every reason
to expect that principal-agent problems on management's side may also lead to
strikes.  For example workplace management may be anxious to impress higher level
management in a large organisation, by toughing out a strike rather than negotiating
to prevent it.  There have certainly been examples of such strikes in the UK public
sector, where management appears to have deliberately provoked strike action in
order to impress government ministers.  The ongoing 1994 dispute between Railtrack
and the main transport union, the RMT, seems to be a very good example of such a
strike.
·over-optimism:  Even if the parties are fully informed and there are no principal-
agent difficulties, strikes could still occur because one or both parties are over-
optimistic about their prospects of victory in the dispute.  Evidence on negotiators
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assessing the same information set in a self-serving biased way has been gleaned
from various laboratory studies of dispute incidence in the US (see Milner, 1993b, for
details).
Two other theories have also been developed by economists to explain strikes,
based respectively on joint costs and risk aversion.  Reder and Neumann (1980)
argued that the incidence of strikes should be considered within the context of
industrial relations institutions.  Their joint cost theory turns on the following line of
reasoning:  strikes are prevented by the establishment of protocols or bargaining rules
such as union recognition, well-developed collective bargaining, internal (to the firm)
and external dispute procedures such as access to conciliation or arbitration bodies;
rules cost time and effort to develop and therefore parties will only use these
resources if the potential joint costs of a strike are relatively high; therefore strikes are
more likely to occur when the potential joint costs of a strike are low or where parties
have had insufficient time to develop bargaining rules.  This theory has some
common ground with institutional strike theories  in suggesting that bargaining rules,4
such as the provision of conciliation, help to prevent strikes.  Finally there is always
the possibility that strikes occur because parties are not risk averse - they are
prepared to take a gamble in an uncertain situation.
Whilst the logic behind some of these theories is more credible and some have
more anecdotal support than others, they have all proved to be notoriously difficult
to test with real world data.  The main problem lies in the abstract nature of the
mechanisms - asymmetric information, principal-agent problems, over-optimistic
bargainers and the like - which are not easily measurable in any direct sense.
Instead, researchers have been forced to use observable proxy variables.  Examples
include using relative wages from the previous settlement to proxy a principal-agent
problem on the workers' side - lower relative wages at t-1 might suggest a shirking
negotiator, and therefore a higher strike probability at t.
To some extent the use of proxy variables is not unusual in trying to test
economic theories, however, it becomes more of a problem when different theories
make the same prediction on an individual proxy variable.  Whether or not the null
hypothesis is rejected in this context, it is impossible to differentiate between the
alternative theories.  For example all five theories would probably predict a negative
association between the occurrence of a strike at t-1 and the probability of one at t.
The mechanism behind this result would range from:  previous strike improved the
information set; to no need to audit agents so soon after a strike; to realistic
expectations imposed by strike; to protocols developed to prevent reoccurrence of a
strike; to gambling tendency scaled down by strike experience.
b.  Evidence
Until relatively recently empirical analysis of the incidence of strikes mainly
made use of aggregate data either by country or in some cases by industry.  Most of
these studies were conducted in something akin to a theoretical vacuum - Kennan
(1986) describes this as "measurement without theory".  With the advent of more
scientific strike theories from the late 1960s, empirical researchers have increasingly
concentrated on using micro data to specifically test one or more of these theories.
Card (1990) and Kennan (1986) provide the best resumés of the empirical strikes
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literature, which is reviewed here largely from the perspective of trying to
understand the Spanish experience.
i.  Macro studies:  Recent examples of macro studies include single country aggregate
time series analysis (eg Kaufman, 1982 on US manufacturing, 1900-1977), comparison
of individual country regressions (Beggs and Chapman, 1987; Paldam and Pederson,
1982), and regressions using multi-country pooled data (Creigh, 1986).  These studies
follow a standard formula with a so-called "theory" section of impressionistic
hypotheses on factors influencing worker propensities to strike (employers'
willingness to take a strike or propensity to concede in the face of a strike threat are
rarely considered).  These factors are then cajoled into a set of often poorly measured
proxy variables.  Regression reports are then reported which appear to fit the
hypotheses, sometimes rather too closely for comfort.
On the surface these studies present a relatively consistent picture of a
negative association between unemployment levels and strikes (though Creigh argues
that this breaks down in the 1970s and 1980s).  Inflation appears to be positively
associated with strike activity in all studies which report it (lagged inflation in
Kaufman's study).  Finally on wages, two of these studies find a significant, positive
association between wages and strike activity.  The impact of various political
variables, like Roosevelt's New Deal in Kaufman's study, are typically examined by
the use of simple time dummies.  Following these examples, we would measure the
impact of Spanish strike laws by using aggregate strikes data and including a dummy
for the provision of a right to strike in the 1978 Constitution.  This would clearly be
an extremely blunt measure of the impact of strike laws, since there were a host of
other political, economic and social changes in motion at this time, which might
explain the upsurge in strike activity.
Not surprisingly these and previous studies have come in for a great deal of
criticism (Wheeler, 1984; and Kennan, 1986, are particularly strong critics) for a
number of reasons: theory and analysis are on different levels which cannot easily be
connected; results are unstable and more detailed work on individual countries
suggest sloppy measurement of economic variables; the measures of non-economic
variables are not construct valid (ie they are generally just time dummies); any result
can be rationalised, therefore the studies are rather unscientific; case studies and/or
micro analysis tells us more about the determinants of strikes.  In reply to these
points, Kaufman and Paldam and Pederson acknowledge some of the difficulties, but
argue that some of these criticisms could apply to any comparative area of study in
industrial relations, not just the analysis of strikes.  Either way, it is clear that the
academic community has turned its collective back on macro studies of strikes in
favour of micro analysis using bargaining group, workplace or firm level data.  This
work has been principally conducted in the US and Canada, but more recently
studies using UK and Australian data have also emerged.
ii.  Micro studies:  Card (1990) summarises the main findings of the US and
Canadian empirical literature on strike incidence using micro data as:  systematic
evidence that higher unemployment reduces strike probabilities; less agreement on
the influence of industry-level demand conditions; and general agreement that
previous real wages are negatively associated with current strike incidence.  Partly
because of difficulties alluded to above regarding proxy variables, Card does not
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conclude that the weight of evidence supports any one of the economic strike theories
or indeed rejects outright any of the theories.  Disgruntled with the inherent
difficulties of testing economic dispute theories with real world data, some US
researchers have turned to the social science laboratory to gauge the relationship
between the failure of negotiations and principal-agent problems, asymmetric
information, over-optimism and risk aversion.  Milner (1993b) reviews and critiques
these studies.
With the advent of the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys in the UK and
Australia (WIRS and AWIRS respectively) and the availability of a large database on
strikes over pay in UK manufacturing (the CBI Pay Databank), a number of studies
have recently emerged from these two countries to complement the North American
literature.  The studies are a hybrid of styles - some quite similar to the macro studies
format (Blanchflower and Cubbin, 1986, using WIRS80; Dawkins and Wooden, 1993,
using AWIRS90) and some more scientific in trying to test economic theories (Booth
and Cressy, 1990, using WIRS84; Ingram et al, 1993, using the CBI data).
There are few consistent findings across the four studies, perhaps
unsurprisingly, with plant size, union density (though not observed in the CBI data)
and multiple unionism which are all positively associated with strike activity.
Without a doubt the Ingram et al study is the most useful despite its restriction to
manufacturing, because unlike the others it is not a one shot cross-section but has a
useful panel element.  The researchers were able to observe the previous bargaining
experience of the bargaining pair - for example whether or not there were strikes in
previous periods and the relative wage outcomes from earlier settlements.  Because
of the time series element, the study is also able to examine the impact of changes in
industrial action law on strike incidence, with the finding that the growing hostility
of these laws over the 1980s is significantly associated with lower strike incidence, all
else equal.  These data have also been used to examine the determinants of the tactics
of industrial actions for the first time, since the survey also records the incidence of
non-strike action such as overtime bans, works to rule and go slows (Milner, 1994).
Despite the richness of the WIRS and AWIRS data in terms of workplace
industrial relations institutions, and the CBI data in terms of a large sample observed
over many bargaining rounds, the authors of these studies have been unable to come
to strong conclusions about the credibility of any one of the economic strike theories.
Ingram et al concluded that they find evidence "both for and against" each of the
three strike theories they examined, and that:
"As on many industrial relations questions, an eclectic approach - drawing
from each theory - may prove the most illuminating." (p.715)
Given the mish-mash of evidence from North America and the less voluminous
literature elsewhere, it would be difficult to argue with this statement.
c.  Relevance to Spain
Given the breadth of theories and debates about both how to test the theories
and the value of existing evidence, it is rather difficult to arrive at definite
conclusions about the implications of economic strike theories for Spain.  Proper
analysis would require a number of micro studies investigating the determinants of
strikes in individual plants or workplaces in different industries, regions and time
periods.  In the absence of such a body of evidence, we are forced to speculate about
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what might explain the recent poor Spanish strike record.  Although rather alot of the
emphasis of economic strike theories are unsurprisingly on the influence of
macroeconomic variables, in policy terms we might be rather more interested in the
impact of industrial relations institutions since they are probably more easily
reformed.
A number of different industrial relations features stand out as possible
contributors to the high strike record.  These are considered in the context of the
different economic strike theories.
·worker representatives and their constituents:  Principal-agent problems are more
likely in an environment in which workers' agents cannot readily be audited, which
does appear to be the case in Spain because of the quadrennial election system for
worker representatives.  There is also a possibility that this representation system
engenders asymmetries of information in that employers must find it very difficult
to accurately judge the militancy of workers who only display that militancy by their
votes for particular candidates in four yearly elections.  A case could also be made
for over-optimism causing strikes as worker representatives, eager to be re-elected,
raise worker expectations to unjustifiably high levels which only a strike defeat can
rationalise.  So even if empirical evidence was found for an association between the
worker representation system and strike activity, this would be consistent with any
one of three theories.
·the multi-level collective bargaining system:  The multi-agent, multi-level collective
bargaining system is likely to exacerbate principal-agent problems.  Especially in the
years of national pacts (up to 1987), the Spanish system of national union
representation, industry level, firm level and in some cases workplace level
representation probably engenders principal-agent problems.  The greater the number
of representational levels, the more likely that workers will believe that at least one
of their representatives is shirking in negotiations with their own employer, a group
of employers or the government.  Cases of striking to test the negotiator's estimate
of the employers' ability to pay are more likely in such an environment.
·absence of adequate voluntary dispute resolution procedures:  Given the
assumption of joint-cost theory that bargaining protocols help to prevent strikes, one
explanation for the high level of strikes in Spain might be the failure to develop a
national system of voluntary dispute resolution procedures in addition to the State-
run conciliation service.  The restriction of labour courts to the resolution of rights
disputes, combined with the distrust of a State-controlled arbitration service, may
play a role in explaining Spain's strike problem.  The obvious test of this proposition
must be to examine the performance of the new voluntary arrangements established
in the Basque Country in 1991 (European Industrial Relations Review, (EIRR), 1991).
If strike rates have fallen, ceteris paribus, relative to the rest of the country, then this
would provide some substantive support to this proposition.
·multiple unionism:  A particularly important feature of the Spanish collective
bargaining system is the presence of multiple unionism at most bargaining points -
because of the proportional representation basis of the worker representative electoral
system.  If the unions were bargaining separately with the employer(s), then there
would be strong grounds for arguing that because of asymmetric information about
what share of the employers' rents each union can capture for its members, strikes
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are more likely.  There is some evidence for this proposition from UK data (see
above).  However, in situations where the unions bargain jointly with the
employer(s), this effect appears to be mollified.  The latter - single table bargaining -
appears to be the norm in Spain (although this is more of a stylised than a
substantiated fact), so the impact of multiple unionism on strike propensities may be
curtailed, though this obviously warrants further investigation.
·fixed-term contracts:  The growth of employment on fixed-term contracts is without
doubt, the most important change in the Spanish labour market in the last decade,
and therefore its possible implications for strike activity should be analysed.  Whilst
the layman's view would probably be that fixed-term contracts should reduce strike
activity because of the reduced power of the workers, none of the strike theories
would arrive at such a conclusion.  The relative power resources of workers and
employers does not feature in any of the economic strike theories.  If anything,
asymmetric information theory might predict a positive association between fixed-
term contracts and the likelihood of strikes because of the indirect influence of job
tenure.  Both union and management representatives in bargaining environments
with a high proportion of workers on short contracts may find it difficult to assess
the militancy of those workers, compared to environments with most workers on
permanent contracts and with relatively long job tenures.  None of the economic
theories would accord with the layman's view of a negative association between
fixed-term contracts and strike activity.
This list of institutions and hypotheses is open to Kennan's critique of the theoretical
sections of macro-based papers, but at very least it provides some link between these
abstract theories and the Spanish experience.
d.  Analysis of inter-industry strike activity in Spain
In the absence of publicly available micro data on strike incidence, industry
strikes data for the period 1986 to 1992 are analysed to attempt to establish some
preliminary evidence on the determinants of strikes.  It is a well established fact in
virtually all countries which collect strikes data that certain industries are
substantially more strike prone than others.  In Spain's case, data on days lost per
thousand employees reported in Table 3 confirm this.  Coal extraction with an
average of over 7 days lost through strike action per employee per year is, as is
typical elsewhere, the most strike ridden industry, followed by mineral extraction and
the railways.  Very low strike rates are found in distribution, business services,
footwear and clothing, rubber and plastics and instrument engineering.
Table 4 presents the results of a simple regression analysis of inter-industry
strike activity.  Independent variables include the extent of collective bargaining
coverage, a measure of bargaining decentralisation, the proportion of employees on
fixed-term contracts and the composition of worker representatives in the industry
(from the 1990 worker representative election results).  The dependent variable is the
log of days lost per thousand employees.
Although there are some important worries about endogeneity in the data
(non-observed variables jointly determining independent and dependent variables),
the results are certainly interesting and offer some pointers to the high level of strike
activity in Spain.  Collective bargaining institutions in terms of coverage, levels and
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composition of representatives are significantly associated with the level of strike
activity.  Some of the results are rather as expected such as the positive association
with collective bargaining coverage, and the negative relationship with the proportion
of non-union worker representatives in the industry.  A dichotomous variable on
whether or not more than 50% of workers are affected by firm-level agreements is
negatively associated with strike activity, significantly so when industry dummies are
included.  The proportion of worker representatives from Unión General de
Trabajadores (UGT) slates shows a strongly negative result, whereas the proportion
of Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) representatives is positively associated with days lost
(although the coefficient becomes non-significant once industry dummies are
included).
Bearing in mind concerns about endogeneity which might suggest that
unobserved forces, like workforce characteristics, are associated with, say, high
bargaining coverage and high strike incidence, these results are still of some value.
The high and sustained level of bargaining coverage in Spain, combined with the
continuing dominance of multi-employer bargaining may play a part in explaining
the high level of strike activity.  The negative coefficient on the decentralised
bargaining dummy is consistent with the multi-agent, multi-level asymmetric
information hypothesis outlined above.  The associations with the composition of
worker representatives, combined with the relative stability in the voting shares of
the main unions since 1980, suggests that union objectives and inter-union politics
may have had some influence on the Spanish strike record.  These areas clearly
warrant further investigation.
Of especial interest is the result on the proportion of workers who are
employed on a fixed-term contract in each industry, which produces a significant
negative coefficient.  The higher the proportion of fixed-term contract workers, the
lower is predicted strike activity.  The coefficient remains significant (though only
just) when industry dummies are included (column II), and when both industry and
year dummies are included in the equation (column III).  As explained above, this
result would not have been predicted by any of the strike theories, and if anything
runs counter to the intuition of asymmetric information theory.
The result may be because of a direct causal link - permanent workers have
a greater propensity to strike because they are permanent, holding all else equal - but
an indirect link is perhaps more likely.  An indirect link could be associated with
either the different composition of permanent and fixed-term employees or the
different composition of firms using a high proportion of fixed-term workers
compared to those using relatively few.  Possible workforce composition effects
include age, gender and occupation with permanent workers tending to be older,
disproportionately male and in manual occupations who are (for some reason) more
predisposed to strike.  Firm composition effects might be plant size and growth rates
with small plants employing disproportionately more temporary workers and faster
growing plants also favouring fixed-term contracts.  The positive association between
plant size and strike incidence is one of the few "facts" about strikes, but the link
between employment growth and strikes is not clearly established.  It is unfortunate
that the data analysed in Table 4 only start in 1986, since it would be interesting to
investigate whether or not inter-industry strike patterns were different before and
after the spread of fixed-term contracts from 1984.
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Whilst this result on fixed-term contracts is fascinating and certainly warrants
further analysis, it does little to explain the high level of Spanish strike activity even
into the late 1980s.  If anything, it makes the sustained high level of activity harder
to explain since the proportion of fixed-term workers in employment increased apace
in the late 1980s to reach almost 30%, at the same time as strike activity per employee
remained high.  This result can only really be explained by a greater propensity on
the part of permanent workers to go on strike, which compensated for the change in
employment composition towards workers apparently significantly less disposed to
strike.  Any contract-forms-based explanation of strike activity in Spain would have
to rationalise such behaviour.
Because of the restricted number of independent variables used in equation I
of Table 4, industry dummies are included in the further two equations to test the
possible role of unobserved industry level divergence.  The data produce results
which would probably be more or less replicated in all developed countries.  The
default or omitted industry is other services, which includes many public services.
Therefore all coefficients report strike activity probabilities compared to that in other
services.  Industries positively associated with strike activity include energy and
water supply (which includes coal mining), metal goods and engineering,
construction and transport and communication (the latter of course incorporating the
railways).  Less strike prone industries are distribution and banking, insurance and
finance.  While on the surface these results might seem rather obvious, it is clear that
we need more comprehensive micro data to discover what is driving these inter-
industry strike differentials, given that we have controlled for some industry
characteristics which might influence the level of strike activity.
6.  Proposed Changes in Spanish Strike Law
Although the main conclusion of this paper is that Spanish strike law probably
plays little role in explaining the high level of strike activity in Spain compared to
most other EU countries, this does not necessarily imply that reform of strike law will
have negligible impact on strike incidence.  Even though the 1978 Constitution's
provision of a right to strike was predicated on the assumption that another statute
would more clearly define the boundaries of that right, it is only in recent years that
serious proposals have come forward from policy makers for such legislation.  These
proposals and their possible implications for strike activity are discussed below.
a.  The proposals
After nearly six months of debate and negotiations between the Minister of
Labour and the leaders of the UGT and CCOO, an agreement was reached in
November/December 1992 on a proposal for a new strike law (EIRR, 1992a and
1992b).  Because of the general election in 1993 this bill was put on ice for a period.
The main provisions concern new rules over strikes in essential services which are
defined in the bill as health, defence, public security, transport and funeral services:
·Any strike in these sectors will be subject to a `minimum service provision' which
appeared to exist already under the 1978 Constitution, but perhaps was less clearly
directed to essential services.  
·Trade unions and employers will have to negotiate what constitutes minimum
service provision for each services.  If such negotiations fail the issue will be
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submitted to mediation and ultimately central or regional government dictat.  Any
strike which violates the minimum service provision will be illegal.
·The public sector strike notification period of 10 days will be extended to designated
essential services - which presumably includes some private sector providers.
·Failure to fulfil minimum service provision may result in dismissal.
Other clauses of the bill also stipulate that strikes which subvert "constitutional
order", violate notice periods, or are targeted at "strategic sectors" of companies will
be illegal.  The most important focus of the legislation is therefore on these
designated essential services.  The government must believe that a minimum service
provision will reduce the impact of strikes by such workers and therefore presumably
reduce the chances of such strikes occurring at all.
b.  Will these new regulations have a marked effect on Spain's poor strike record?
This turns on two factors:  whether or not the regulations will reduce the level
of strike activity in the sectors for which this is principally designed - the essential
service industries, and how poor the relative strike records of these industries are,
compared to other industries (and of course their relative employment size).
Answering the latter question is obviously more straightforward than answering the
first.
The industries of particular relevance to this proposed legislation are transport
(71 to 76), defence and public security (91 and 99, which also includes public
administration) and health (94).  The only one of these sectors which seems
particularly strike prone is transport and particularly the railways.  None of the other
two groupings show a particularly high level of strike activity.  Therefore the data
suggest that even if the new strike law actually succeeds in changing behaviour
within the targeted industries, this would still make a relatively minor dent in the
overall Spanish picture.  The success of the law in reducing strike activity in the
targeted industries will depend on three factors:  the willingness of unions to flout
the law; the degree of sanctions available to employers against such flouting (which
will obviously have a direct influence on the degree of flouting); the willingness of
employers to use whatever sanctions are available against unions and workers in
breach of it.  The government may also have to consider the provision of a quid pro
quo in the form of an independent conciliation and arbitration service along the lines
of ACAS.
7.  Conclusions
Spanish strikes law does not appear to explain the high level of strikes in Spain
compared to the other large EU countries during the 1980s and early 1990s.  Spanish
law is not particularly permissive compared to Germany and particularly France and
Italy, though both procedural and substantive rules are less stringent than those in
Britain.  This conclusion prompts two important questions:  if not strikes law, what
can explain the high level of strike activity in Spain? and could more fundamental
changes in Spanish strike law reduce strike activity?
On the first question, strike theories and the range of results from empirical
studies provide a welter of possible culprits on whom to pin the blame.  These
include macroeconomic factors, political variables, union membership and
organisation, the lack of interest arbitration facilities, other labour laws on worker
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representation, works councils and fixed-term contracts.  Simple regression analysis
of inter-industry data for a seven year period suggest important roles for the
collective bargaining system, union objectives, inter-union rivalry and fixed-term
contracts.  However, there also appear to be substantial industry fixed-effects which
require more micro based studies to explain.  Most of the interesting work in the
disputes arena is now on micro data anyway, and this seems to be the obvious next
step for Spanish research, especially if collective bargaining becomes more
decentralised.  The experiment with conflict settlement in the Basque Country also
merits research interest, to establish whether or not the negotiation of a central
agreement on voluntary dispute settlement procedures from 1991 promoted the
reduction of strike activity compared to other regions without such apparatus.
Given the British experience it is tempting to argue that toughening up Spanish
strike laws will reduce strike activity.  Possible reforms would include:  permitting
non-strike action; compulsory strike ballots - ie removing the right of union leaders
and works councils to call strikes; increasing sanctions available to employers in the
event of an illegal strike; cooling-off periods; and compulsory conciliation or
arbitration.  Some of these reforms, especially compulsory arbitration, would be
politically unfeasible because they are too reminiscent of Franco's restrictions on
strikes.  Compulsory strike ballots could be proposed as a means to increase union
democracy and might well lead to reduced strike activity if they provide accurate
information on the strength of feeling among workers about particular issues.
Permitting non-strike action might provide a lower cost means of expressing
dissatisfaction compared to the strike.  However, the most fundamental difference
between the UK and Spain is that unions were on the decline in the UK (in numerical
and organisational terms) at the same time as the introduction of anti-strike
legislation.  By comparison, union power in terms of bargaining coverage looks
unassailable in Spain, therefore it is unlikely that changes in strike laws, however far-
reaching, will have a particularly significant effect on strike activity.
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1. The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, a statutory body,
established in 1974.
2. According to some sources the local labour inspectors play an informal
conciliation role in disputes in their areas.  There appear to be no published data on
their activities, so we are unable to pass comment on their influence on strike activity.
3. There are three circumstances under which a lock out may be legal:  if there
is a clear danger of damage to goods or persons; if there is an illegal occupation of
the employer's premises or there is likely to be one; and, rather cryptically, if there
are irregularities that have a "deep" affect on the production process (Guia Laboral,
1993).
4. This school of thought, as its name suggests, emphasises the importance of
collective bargaining institutions as determinants of inter-industry and inter-country
differences in strike activity.  Adherents include Clegg (1976) and Durcan et al (1983).
ENDNOTES
*I am grateful to Manual Arellano, Samuel Bentolila, Juan Dolado, Juan Jimeno,
David Metcalf and Gustavo Nombela for comments on an earlier draft.
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APPENDIX A
Disputes data
1.  Strike Activity in Spain:  Table 1 and Figures 1 to 4.
Sources:
Stoppages and workers involved
1980-92: Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas
Laborales, HUE-1.
1976-79: Miguelez and Prieto (1991), Cuadro 1A Anexo Estadístico.
1970-75: Miguelez and Prieto (1991), Cuadro 1B Anexo Estadístico.
Days lost
1980-92: Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas
Laborales, HUE-1.
1976-79: Miguelez and Prieto (1991), Cuadro 1A Anexo Estadístico.
1970-75: Days lost per 1000 employees taken from Creigh (1989), Table 9.3.
Employees in employment
1976-92: Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas
Laborales, EPA-13.
Notes:
a. Strikes data for Catalonia are excluded for the years 1983-85, and those for the
Basque Country are excluded for the years 1986-89.
b. There are significant discrepancies between the official series on stoppages and
workers involved (reported here from 1976 onwards) and the continuation of the
1970-75 series which is that collected by the CEOE (employers' organisation).  For
example in 1988 (the last reported year of the CEOE series) 2823 stoppages were
recorded with over 8m workers involved, compared to the official series of 1193
stoppages involving 6.7m workers.  Unfortunately the CEOE series as reported in
Miguelez and Prieto does not include data on days lost (it actually has hours lost).
c. There are also discrepancies between the official figures on days lost per 1000
employees (reported from 1976) and the continuation of the 1970-75 series which is
taken from Creigh (1989), but of a much smaller magnitude than those between the
CEOE and official data.  For example, for 1984 Creigh reports 890 days lost per 1000
employees whereas the official Spanish data put the figure at 871.  Creigh refers to
an unpublished paper for his sources in this period which means that it is not
immediately obvious why the discrepancies arise.  It is probably because of revisions
made to the official figures not included in Creigh's data.
2.  Non-Strike Collective Disputes:  Table 2 and Figure 4
Sources:
All data are drawn from Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de
Estadísticas Laborales.  Specific tables are:
Conciliation cases MAC-1
Mediation cases MAC-1
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Labour court cases AJS-1
Notes:
a. Basque Country data on conciliation and mediation cases are not included in the
totals for 1986-1990.  Basque Country mediation cases are also excluded from the 1991
total.
b. The failure of conciliation rate in Table 2 calculated as the sum of categories "Sin
avenencia" (no agreement), "Intentados sin efecto" (one party did not appear at the
hearing) and "Otras causas" (problems in communication of the hearing dates etc) in
MAC-1, divided by the total number of cases.
3.  Days Lost Data for UK, France, Italy and Germany:  Figures 5 and 6
Sources:
1970-84 Creigh (1989), Table 9.3.
1985-92 Bird (1993), Table 1.
4.  Days Lost per 1000 Employees by Industry in Spain 1986-1992: Tables 3 and 4
Sources:
Days lost
Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales,
HUE-6.
Employees
Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales,
EPA-16.
Notes:
a. Days lost data for 1986-89 do not include the Basque Country, whereas industry
employees in employment data do include it.
b. Days lost data do not include days lost through general strikes.
5.  Independent Variables by Industry for Regression Analysis, Table 4
Sources:
Collective bargaining coverage and levels
Ministerio de Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social, Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales,
CON-15 and CON-18.
Proportion of employees on fixed-term contracts
Supplied by Juan Jimeno, FEDEA.
Worker representatives (1990 election)
Supplied by Juan Jimeno, FEDEA.
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APPENDIX B
Strike Law in 12 EU Countries
1.  Belgium
General principles: "... almost complete freedom to engage in industrial
warfare by the social partners..." ie very high level of
autonomy from legal interference.
Right to strike for Employment contract is merely suspended during
individual workers: strike.
Right to organise strike Not confined to trade unions.
action:
Procedural rules applied None, though parties often impose their own through
to strikes: peace obligations and dispute procedures.
Sympathy strikes: Lawful.
Political strikes: Unlawful.
Non-strike industrial Unlawful.
action:
Picketing: Lawful, if peaceful.
Dispute procedures: Nothing compulsory.
Lock-out: Lawful but unusual.
Essential services: No statutory position but joint committee of
employers and TUs must determine what services to
be maintained in event of strike and how they are
maintained.
Date of information: 1990.
Source: Blanpain, R., in Blanpain, R., (ed), International
Encyclopedia. 
2.  Denmark
General principles: General right to strike except during period of
collective agreement.
Right to strike for Contract of employment is terminated.  But many
individual workers: collective agreements stipulate suspension rather than
termination.
Right to organise strike Not confined to trade union, any group of more than
action: 1 worker can organise industrial action.
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Procedural rules applied Notice period is same as would apply to termination
to strikes: of contract unless collective agreement states
otherwise (and many do).
Denmark continued
Sympathy strikes: Lawful.
Political strikes: Unlawful but minimal sanctions apply.
Non-strike industrial Apparently lawful.
action:
Picketing: Not clear.
Dispute procedures: Not mentioned.
Lock-out: Not mentioned.
Essential services: Do not appear to be treated differently.
Date of information: 1988.
Source: Jacobsen, P., in Blanpain, R., (ed), International
Encyclopedia.
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3.  France
General principles: Constitutionally guaranteed right to strike in pursuit
of `occupational or professional aims'.
Right to strike for Employment contracts are merely suspended during
individual workers: a strike.
Right to organise strike Conferred on both individuals and unions.
action:
Procedural rules applied Notification period only in public sector.
to strikes:
Sympathy strikes: Unclear position.  Some attempt to delineate internal
and external (to enterprise) sympathy action.
Political strikes: Unlawful unless in occupational or professional
interests.
Non-strike industrial Unlawful.
action:
Picketing: Legal, if peaceful.
Dispute procedures: Voluntary conciliation provided but no obligation to
use.  No compulsory arbitration.  No peace obligations
in collective agreements, therefore intra-contractual
strikes are permitted.
Lock-out: Apparently unlawful. 
Essential services: Do not appear to be any special rules for essential
services.
Date of information: 1987.
Sources: Betten, L. (1985), Despax, M and Rojot, J. in Blanpain,
R., (ed), International Encyclopedia.
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4.  Germany
General principles: Strikes only lawful when complementary to collective
bargaining.  Notion of `proportionality' - strikes must:
 respect peace obligation; be preceded by secret ballot;
be `fair' (not aim to destroy firm); and be weapon of
last resort (aka ultima ratio).  Exception made for
`warning strikes'.
Right to strike for Contract of employment is suspended.
individual workers:
Right to organise strike Held only by licensed trade union taking part in
action: collective bargaining.
Procedural rules applied Secret ballot.  Peace obligation means that any dispute
to strikes: procedures in collective agreement must be exhausted.
Sympathy strikes: Permissable in very narrow circumstances.
Political strikes: Unlawful.
Non-strike industrial Not mentioned.  Probably unlawful because of peace
action: obligation during contract.
Picketing: Not mentioned.
Dispute procedures: Not prescribed by law but parties encouraged to have
procedures in collective agreements.
Lock-out: Not mentioned.
Essential services: Have to be kept running because of proportionality
principle.  No statutory rules on definition of
`essential services'.
Date of information: 1986 (therefore information is for old West Germany).
Sources: Betten, L. (1985), Weiss, M. in Blanpain, R., (ed),
International Encyclopedia.
5.  Great Britain
General principles: Immunities based system.  Individuals have no `right
to strike', instead protection from civil tort action
provided for organisers of strikes (individuals and/or
unions).  Immunity only maintained by adherence to
extensive procedural rules for strikes over `trade
disputes' ie between workers and their own employer
at least mainly related to industrial relations issues.
Right to strike for None.  Striking worker can be dismissed without
individual workers: compensation.  Previous restrictions preventing
victimisation of strike leaders now relaxed.
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Right to organise strike Held by both individuals and trade unions for certain
action: types of strikes if strict rules are followed.  Illegal
wild-cat strikes (eg unballoted) must be condemned
by union leaders or union may be sued.  Employers,
union members and consumers can take civil action
against strike organisers for illegal strikes.
Procedural rules applied Compulsory pre-strike postal ballots.  Employer to be
to strikes: notified 7 days before ballot takes place.  Wording of
ballot paper must conform to statute. 
Sympathy strikes: Unlawful, as are strikes in pursuit of a closed shop or
over disputes between workers.
Political strikes: Unlawful.
Non-strike industrial Covered by same rules as strikes, ie lawful within
action: certain strictly defined rules.
Picketing: Lawful if at own place of work and peaceful.  Code of
Practice recommends maximum of 6 pickets per
entrance.
Dispute procedures: Provided through statutory body (ACAS).  Extensive
use of collective conciliation.  Little use of mediation
and arbitration.  NB:  dispute procedures in collective
agreements do not constitute peace obligation (as in
other EU countries) because collective agreements are
not legally binding.
Lock-out: Lawful but unusual.
Essential services: Criminal offence for armed forces and police.  Some
ambiguity over communications workers and prison
officers.
Date of information: 1993.
Source: Simpson, R., (1993).
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6.  Greece
General principles: Constitutionally protected right to strike.  Minimum
services have to be maintained during a strike.
Right to strike for Employment contract suspended during strike.
individual workers:
Right to organise strike Held by trade unions only.  Wild-cat strikes are
action: illegal.
Procedural rules applied 24 hours notification period, 4 days for some public
to strikes: sector workers.
Sympathy strikes: Apparently restricted to unions in multi-national
companies - may mean multi-plant.
Political strikes: Not mentioned.
Non-strike industrial Not mentioned.
action:
Picketing: Not mentioned.
Dispute procedures: Voluntary conciliation available.  Apparently leads to
compulsory arbitration.
Lock-out: Not mentioned.
Essential services: Security forces banned from striking.  Limitations for
other public sector groups - civil servants, health
workers, communications.
Date of information: 1990.
Source: Koniaris, T. in Blanpain, R., (ed), International
Encyclopedia.
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7.  Ireland
General principles: Very similar to Great Britain ie immunities from civil
tort action for unions organising action.  Strikes
permitted within certain rules.
Right to strike for Contract of employment is terminated.
individual workers:
Right to organise strike Not restricted to trade unions but must be a trade
action: dispute and abide by the `golden formula'.
Procedural rules applied Secret ballots compulsory after 1990 Industrial
to strikes: Relations Act.  Notice must be similar length to that
required to terminate contracts ordinarily.  At least
one week prevents employer obtaining ex parte
injunction.
Sympathy strikes: Probably unlawful.
Political strikes: Probably unlawful.
Non-strike industrial Not mentioned.  Presumably covered by same
action: provisions as strikes.
Picketing: Not mentioned.  Presumably same as GB.
Dispute procedures: Provided through Labour Relations Commission.
Provision for ministerial referral of disputes affecting
public interest.
Lock-out: Presumably same as GB.
Essential services: Strikes are a criminal offence for gas and electricity
workers.  Police and armed forces cannot join unions
or take industrial action.
Date of information: 1991.
Source: Redmond, M. in Blanpain, R., (ed), International
Encyclopedia.
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8.  Italy
General principles: Constitutionally guaranteed right to strike "within law
regulating it".  But no statute law has defined the
limits of this right.
Right to strike for Contract of employment only suspended during
individual workers: strike.
Right to organise strike Not restricted to unions.
action:
Procedural rules applied Only in public sector (see Essential services)
to strikes:
Sympathy strikes: Permitted if a common interest exists.
Political strikes: No longer completely illegal but cannot be designed
to "subvert the constitutional order".
Non-strike industrial Tends to be regarded as illegal by the courts though
action: with some controversy.
Picketing: Lawful if peaceful.
Dispute procedures: Nothing in law but increasing use of conciliation
included in collective agreement.
Lock-out: Apparently unlawful.
Essential services: Police and armed forces cannot strike.  Since Act in
1990 a notification period of 10 days required and
minimum services to be maintained.
Date of information: 1991.
Sources: Betten, L. (1985), Treu, T. in Blanpain, R., (ed),
International Encyclopedia.
33
9.  Luxembourg 
General principles: A general right to strike, no other details provided.
Right to strike for Not mentioned but presumably the contract of
individual workers: employment is suspended.
Right to organise strike Presumably not restricted to unions.
action:
Procedural rules applied Apparently none.
to strikes:
Sympathy strikes: Apparently lawful.
Political strikes: Apparently lawful.
Non-strike industrial Not mentioned.
action:
Picketing: Presumably lawful.
Dispute procedures: Not mentioned.
Lock-out: Not mentioned.
Essential services: Not mentioned, presumably no special provisions.
Date of information: 1990.
Source: Schintgen, R. in Blanpain, R., (ed),  International
Encyclopedia.
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10.  The Netherlands
General principles: Legal position of strikes is unclear.  Mixture of court
cases and legislative bills (not acts) provide some
`rules' - strike unlawful if:  contrary to statute law;
contrary to collective agreement; contrary to existing
norms between union and employer; it is manifestly
unreasonable towards the employer.
Right to strike for Employment contract suspended during strike.
individual workers:
Right to organise strike Held only by trade unions.  Wild-cat strikes are
action: illegal.
Procedural rules applied Not clear but presumably strikes are only lawful when
to strikes: contracts are renegotiated.
Sympathy strikes: Not clear.
Political strikes: Not clear.
Non-strike industrial Not clear but presumably unlawful.
action:
Picketing: Not mentioned.
Dispute procedures: No formal dispute procedures supported by the state.
Lock-out: Not mentioned.
Essential services: Not clear.
Date of information: 1993.
Source: Rood, M. in Blanpain, R. (ed), International
Encyclopedia.
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11.  Portugal
General principles: Right to strike is safeguarded in broad terms such that
common law cannot restrict that right.
Right to strike for Employment contract is suspended during strike.
individual workers:
Right to organise strike Held by both unions and worker assemblies (works
action: councils?).
Procedural rules applied For workers assemblies to call strike, must have
to strikes: conducted secret ballot of majority of workers in the
enterprise with a majority supporting action.
Sympathy strikes: Lawful.
Political strikes: Lawful.
Non-strike industrial Unclear.
action:
Picketing: Lawful, if peaceful.
Dispute procedures: Some use of state provided conciliation but little use
of either mediation or arbitration.
Lock-out: Prohibited.
Essential services: During any strike workers and unions have to
perform essential services - not clear how these are
defined.
Date of information: 1988.
Source: Pinto, M. in Blanpain, R., (ed)., International
Encyclopedia.
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12.  Spain
General principles: Constitutionally protected right to strike.
Right to strike for Contract of employment is suspended during strike.
individual workers:
Right to organise strike Held by unions and works councils/workers'
action: representatives.
Procedural rules applied Five days advance notice to employer, 10 days in
to strikes: public sector.  Compulsory strike committee which
must guarantee the provision of services for the
security and maintenance of the company during the
strike.
Sympathy strikes: Apparently permissable after 1981 Constitutional
Court ruling.
Political strikes: Unlawful.
Non-strike industrial Unlawful.
action:
Picketing: Lawful, if peaceful.
Dispute procedures: Provision for collective conciliation, mediation and
arbitration for interest and rights disputes.  Labour
courts for rights disputes only.  State can sanction
compulsory arbitration for disputes affecting public
interest.
Lock-out: Lawful in certain situations.
Essential services: Security forces and merchant navy prohibited from
striking.  Hospital and railway staff have restricted
rights.
Date of information: Up to 1992.
Sources: Guia Laboral (1993), ILO (1985), McElrath (1989).
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TABLE 1
Strike Activity in Spain 1970-1992
Year Stoppages Workers involved Days lost per
(000s) 1000 employees
1970 817 366 137
1971 601 267 107
1972 688 305 70
1973 811 441 125
1974 1193 626 199
1975 855 556 205
1976 1568 3639 1438
1977 1194 2956 1882
1978 1128 3864 1341
1979 2680 5713 2253
1980 1365 1170 777
1981 1307 1126 660
1982 1225 875 361
1983 1451 1484 575
1984 1498 2242 871
1985 1092 1511 446
1986 914 858 298
1987 1497 1881 630
1988 1193 6692 (1895) 1394 (819)
1989 1047 1382 415
1990 1231 864 263
1991 1552 1945 472
1992 1296 5170 (1679) 688 (447)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are excluding workers involved and days lost in
1988 and 1992 general strikes.
Sources: see Appendix A.
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TABLE 2
Collective Conciliation in Spain 1981-1992
Year Number of Agreement No agreement % failure
cases reached
1981 2505 163 2342 93.5
1982 2247 103 2144 95.4
1983 3235 193 3042 94.0
1984 2266 114 2152 95.0
1985 1779 127 1652 92.9
1986 1488 130 1358 91.3
1987 1691 174 1517 89.7
1988 1871 197 1674 89.5
1989 1912 213 1699 88.9
1990 1686 202 1484 88.0
1991 2456 218 2238 91.1
1992 1909 145 1764 92.4
Notes and Sources:  see Appendix A.
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TABLE 3
Days Lost per 1000 Employees by Industry:  Spain 1986-1992
(average of annual figures over period)
Industry SIC Days lost per
Order 1000 employees
Agriculture and horticulture 1-3 268.0
Forestry and hunting 4,5  41.0
Fishing 6 400.6
Coal extraction 11 7577.9
Extraction of mineral oils 12-14 2107.2
Electricity, gas and water 15,16 119.5
Extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 21,23 583.6
Metal manufacturing 22 1247.2
Manufacture of non-metallic minerals 24  92.2
Chemical industry 25 313.5
Manufacture of metal goods n.e.s. 31 1201.7
Mechanical engineering 32 127.9
Manufacture of office machinery and electronic 33,35 172.5
goods
Manufacture of electrical goods 34 540.0
Manufacture of motor vehicles and parts 36 808.0
Shipbuilding and other vehicles 37,38 433.0
Instrument engineering 39  40.4
Food, drink and tobacco 41,42 268.9
Textile industry 43 783.9
Manufacture of leather and leather goods 44 267.2
Footwear and clothing 45  34.6
Timber and wooden furniture 46 703.7
Paper, printing and publishing 47 530.8
Rubber and plastics 48  39.2
Other manufacturing industries 49 450.3
Construction 50 842.5
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TABLE 3 continued
Industry SIC Days lost per
Order 1000 employees
Wholesale distribution, scrap 61-63  36.1
Retail distribution 64  39.7
Restaurants, cafes and hotels 65,66 184.9
Repairs 67 104.9
Railways 71 1475.7
Other inland transport 72 665.4
Sea and air transport 73,74 541.0
Supporting services to transport 75,76 678.3
Banking and finance, real estate 81-83 256.3
Business services, renting 84-86  38.3
Public administration and defence 91,99 215.8
Sanitary services 92 1120.2
Education 93 510.4
Health services 94 1081.1
Recreational and cultural services 95,96 135.6
Personal services 97  19.6
Domestic services 98  3.8
Sources:  see Appendix A.
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TABLE 4
Regression Analysis of Spanish Industry Strikes Data 1986-1992
Variables I II III
Collective bargaining coverage 1.604*** 1.720*** 1.789***
(0.296) (0.296) (0.301)
More than 50% of workers affected by 0.258 -0.712** -0.713**
firm-level agreements (0.304) (0.356) (0.358)
Proportion of employees on fixed-term -3.465*** -1.889* -3.124**
contracts (0.877) (1.014) (1.468)
Proportion of worker UGT -5.411*** -6.216*** -5.265***
representatives: (1.594) (1.646) (1.791)
CCOO 2.791** 0.371 0.538
(1.333) (1.641) (1.646)
CIG 7.617 10.910 9.228
(1.140) (6.861) (6.980)
Non-union -13.747*** -14.116*** -13.217***
(3.851) (4.231) (4.286)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing -0.322 -0.134
(0.466) (0.504)
Energy and water supply 1.775*** 1.534***
(0.505) (0.529)
Extraction of minerals, metal 0.390 0.284
manufacture, chemicals (0.362) (0.369)
Metal goods, engineering and vehicles 0.915** 0.833**
(0.381) (0.383)
Other manufacturing industries 0.204 0.165
(0.337) (0.337)
Construction 1.067* 1.282*
(0.637) (0.666)
Distribution, hotels and catering, -0.895** -0.906**
repairs (0.369) (0.368)
Transport and communication 1.081*** 0.934**
(0.397) (0.408)
Banking, insurance and finance -1.381*** -1.419***
(0.480) (0.479)
Year dummies No No Yes
Constant 6.502*** 7.159*** 7.254***
(0.908) (0.929) (0.943)
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Diagnostics I II III
n 290 290 290
F 15.94  11.61 8.86
Prob F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R 0.266 0.370 0.3752
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is log of days lost due to strikes per
thousand employees in employment.  Note that days lost due to
general strikes are excluded from the data.
2. Fixed term contracts:  there are no disaggregated numbers for
1986, therefore 1987's data are used for 1986 observations.
3. Worker representatives data are for the 1990 elections only.
4. Default category for industry dummies is SIC 9 = Other services.
5. Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.
Sources: see Appendix A.
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FIGURE 1
Stoppages in Spain 1970-1992
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Stoppages per 1000 Employees:  Spain 1976-1992
FIGURE 3
Days Lost per 1000 Employees in Spain:  1970-1992
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FIGURE 4
Collective Disputes in Spain 1981-1992
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FIGURE 5
Days Lost per 1000 Employees in 5 EU Countries:  1970-1992
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FIGURE 6
Days Lost per 1000 Employees in 5 EU Countries:  1970-1992
(annual averages within each period, unweighted)
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